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The defendant by the Information in this action was 
charged with the murder of Ray Ashdown, on the 5th day 
of July, 1955, at Cedar City, Iron County, Utah. 
The action was tried in Iron County, Utah, on August 
22 to 26th, 1955, when the Jury returned a verdict of guilty 
of murder in the first degree with a recommendation of life 
imprisonment, from which the defendant appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Appellant was the wife of Ray Ashdown. 
They lived at Cedar City, Utah; On the morning of July 5, 
1955, Dr. R. G. Williams was called to the Ashdown residence 
by Mrs. Ashdown to attend her husband Ray. When the 
Doctor arrived Mr. Ashdown was having a generalized con-
vulsive seizure and death seemed to be imminent. He told 
the Doctor he had drank some lemon juice about a half hour 
before, then he took another convulsion and died. (T. 21-5). 
Analysis of the contents of the stomach of Mr. Ashdown by 
the State Chemist revealed that the same contained strych-
nine and the cause of his death was attributed to strychnine 
poisoning. There was a bottle of lemon juice found in the 
refrigerator of the Ashdown home but it did not contain any 
strychnine (T. 45-7) and no where in the home was any 
strychnine found. (T.57). 
On the 9th of July, 1955, a funeral was held for Ray 
Ashdown, and at the cemetery after the burial the Sheriff 
of Iron County, Arthur Nelson, asked Mrs. Ashdown's son-
in-law to bring Mrs. Ashdown to the City and County Build-
ing for a talk. The defendant and her sister came to the 
Sheriff's Office. There were present Sheriff Nelson and 
Deputies Arch Benson and Chuck Wells. The ladies com-
plained about the heat and were served a glass of lemonade. 
The Sheriff then asked if they could talk to defendant alone 
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in the Courtroom. They went into the Court Room where 
in addition to the Sheriff and his, Deputies, the District At-
torney, Patrick H. Fenton was present. (T. 91-2). Then the 
defendant was subjetced to a series of questioning which be-
gan at about 4 in the afternoon and did not end until about 9 
or 9 :30 in the evening, during all of which time defendan~ 
never left the room, was not given any food or rest, and at 
about 8 :30 in the evening defendant made certain statements 
to the effect that she put the poison in the cup of lemon 
juice and gave it to her husband to drink, after which she 
was held on a charge of murder in the first degree. (T.71-9). 
The record discloses that the defendant was a person of 
limited education, having gone to school only to the seventh 
or eighth grade-that she was married between the age of 
16 and 17 years (T-113)- that she had just attended the 
funeral and burial of her husband when she was taken to 
the Court House for questioning-that the weather was ex-
tremely hot (T.71-2)-that she was in a hysterical frame 
of mind and sobbed and cried during the questioning (T. 107, 
116, 135) -that .she was taken in for questioning alone and 
was not represented by family, friends or legal counsel-
that her father was in the Court House during the question-
ing and requested that she be given an attorney, but her 
father as well as her uncle were denied admission to the 
Court Room where she was being questioned, and were told 
that there was an attorney in there to represent her. (T. 78, 
86-7, 97, 105-6). The defendant, after the alleged admission, 
requested legal counsel which request was entirely ignored. 
(T. 136). Next day a written confession was prepared by the 
Sheriff and handed to her for signing which she did. (T.83-
4). At the trial of the action counsel for defendant objected 
to the admission of the written testimony and of the testi-
mony and evidence relating to the oral confessions for the 
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reasons they were obtained in violation of the Constitutional 
rights of the defendant, (T. 118-19) and the Court ruled the 
written confession should not be admitted but made find-
ings to the effect that there was no coercion, duress. or prom-
ises of immunity or violation of constitutional rights of de-
fendant (T. 150-53). The case went to the Jury and the 
Jury after deliberating some 19 hours returned a verdict of 
guilty with recommendation of life imprisonment (T. 190). 
It is from the findings of the Court and the verdict of the 
Jury that this appeal is taken, on the grounds· and points 
hereinafter stated : 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. THE VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO LAW 
AND THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THERE WAS NO COERCION, DURESS OR PROMISES 
OF IMMUNITY OR VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT. 
POINT III. THE COUR.T ERRED IN ADMITTING 
TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BY THE 
STATE TO THE EFFECT THAT DEFENDANT UNDER 
ORAL QUESTIONING PRIOR TO HER ARREST, ORAL-
LY CONFESSED TO CRIME CHARGED, FOR THE REA-
SON THAT SUCH TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE WERE 
OBTAINED THROUGH COERCION, DURESS AND 
PROMISES OF IMMUNITY AND IN VIOLATION OF 
LAW AND OF THE GUARANTEES OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATE OF 
UTAH. 
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN CHARGING 
THE JURY AS PER HIS INSTRUCTION NO. 6, BY 
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WHICH THE JURY WAS CONFUSED AND MISDIRECT-
ED SO AS TO RENDER AN IMPROPER VERDICT 
AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
POINT V. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL. 
POINT VI. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR. NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND 
THE EVIDENCE. 
Aside from the oral admissions made by the defendant 
during the questioning by the officers there was no other 
evidence in the record connecting defendant with the crime. 
There was no strychnine found in the home or no record of 
defendant's purchasing any from any drug store, nor did 
the officers find any at the farm of Kumen Jones, where the 
defendant said she obtained it. There was no evidence of 
any outside source whatsoever to connect defendant with 
the crime. 
As will be hereinafter strongly contended by the de-
fense, that all of the testimony and evidence that defendant 
confessed to the crime charged, is and was inadmissible, and 
if such contention is upheld by this Court, then there is no 
other evidence to support the charge and the verdict of the 
Jury must be set aside. 
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THERE WAS NO COERCION, DURESS OR 
PROMISES OF IMMUNITY OR VIOLATION 
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Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution of Utah, pro-
vides.: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah, provides: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel. 
***The accused shall not be compelled to give evi-
dence against himself.*** 
The Court made findings with regard to the admissibil-
ity of the testimony given by Sheriff Arthur Nelson, his 
Deputies and Patrick H. Fenton, the District Attorney to 
the effect that there was no promise made or assurance 
given of any immunity for prosecution (2) That defendant 
was advised of her constitutional rights before she made the 
statements sought to be introduced (3) That she did not ask 
for an attorney until after such statements were made (4) 
That she was questioned by the officers from approximately 
4 :00 P.M. until approoximately 8 :30 P.M. before she made 
the statements in question, and that her sister, her father 
and her uncle were not permitted to go into the Courtroom 
during the course of that questioning. (5) That there were 
no threats of violence or other threats made by either of the 
officers .or by the District Attorney ( 6) That there was no 
promise made nor any assurance given of any benefit or 
reward, except the District Attorney informed the defendant 
that if poison had been given by mistake it might make a 
difference between a prosecution £or murder and manslaugh-
ter, and informed the defendant of the penalties for those 
respective offenses (7) That the method of examination and 
circumstances were not severe enough to amount to compul-
sion as that is contemplated by the constitutional provisions 
or statutes which provide that a person shall not be c·ompell-
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ed to give evidence against himself. (8) That the circum-
stances were not such as to induce the defendant to make 
the statements in question and (9) that the inducing cause 
of the statement was not fear nor duress, nor compulsion, 
nor any promise or assurance of any reward or immunity. 
(Transcript page 150). 
The defense contends that the Court erred in such find-
ings, and that the alleged confession was not free and volun-
tary and was obtained in violation of the guarantees of the 
State Constitution and of the United States Constitution 
which stands as a bar against the conviction of any individ-
ual in an American Court by means of a coerced confession, 
or the denial of the right to counsel, or the denial of due 
pr.ocess. 
The record is replete with instances to show that de-
fendant's alleged confession was not voluntary. 
Appellant sets forth the circumstances surrounding 
such examination of the defendant as follows: 
1. Defendant was a person of limited education. 
2. She was in a hysterical frame of mind having at-
tended the funeral and burial of her husband just immediat-
ely prior to the questioning. 
3. The weather was extremely hot. 
4. No member of her family was permitted to be in 
the room with her during such examination, although her 
father and uncle requested it. 
5. She was continuously questioned and kept in the 
Court Room from 4 P.M. until 9 :30 P.lVI. and at 8:30 P.M. 
such alleged confession was made by her. 
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6. She did not have benefit of counsel during such ex-
amination, and was not properly advised of her constitu-
tional rights. 
7. Officers repeated questions and statements over and 
over. 
Appellant sets forth excerpts: from the record to sub-
stantiate the above circumstances and to show that the al-
leged statements were not made freely and voluntarily by 
her but were the product of sustained questioning and pres-
sure, and that her constitutional rights against self incrim-
ination, the right to counsel and due process were flagrantly 
violated: 
That defendant was a person of limited education: 
William Hopkins, Direct, Transcript page 113 : 
"Q How much of an education did she have? 
A Very little education.**She probably pass:ed 
the seventh or eighth grade. ***She was be-
tween sixteen and seventeen years of age when 
she was married. Just a child like." 
Defendant was requested to come to Court Room for 
questioning directly after the funeral of her husband: 
Sheriff Arthur Nelson, Drect, Transcript page 71 : 
"I asked to have her come up. I went out to the cem-
etery and the funeral was: just ·over and they were 
ready to leave and I contacted her brother-in-law** 
Stewart had Mrs. Ashdown in his car, he was a son-
in-law of Mrs. Ashdown, and I asked him if he would 
ask Stewart to bring Mrs. Ashdown by the County 
and City Building, we would like to talk to her. So 
Alf brought word back to me that he would go that 
way and take Mrs. Ashdown to the County and City 
Building.'' 
The weather was hot: 
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Sheriff Arthur Nelson, Direct, Transcript page 72: 
"Well they were complaining about it being hot and 
it was hot so we served them a glass of lemonade, 
and then I asked Mrs. Ashdown if we could talk to 
her alone in the courtroom. And so we went into the 
courtroom and talked with her." 
No member of her family was permitted to be in the 
Court Room with her during such examination, although her 
father and uncle requested it: 
Sheriff Arthur Nelson, Direct, Transcript page 73 : 
"Q Was Mr. Arch Benson, another deputy sheriff. 
present during this conversation? 
A No, he was out in the hallway sort of taking 
care of the door ; there was people trying to 
come in and out and we tried to keep everyone 
out of the courtroom. 
Charles Wells, by Court, Transcript page 138: 
"Q Did he -say he would like to talk to her. alone? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Her sister was with her at that time? 
A Her sister was in the Sheriff's Office at the 
time, yes, sir." 
Walter Segler, Direct, Transcript page 104: 
"A Well, when they entered the door at the foot of 
the stairs this Mr. Benson was at the foot of 
the steps and didn't figure on anybody entering 
there. 
Mr. Segler continuing from Transcript page 105: 
"Q Who was with you? 
A Well, Mr. Hopkins, her father. 
And I says I am her uncle and this is her father. 
And I says I don't think she has got a right to 
be questioned without her father's presence or 
some attorney. 
Q What happened. 
A And I said I would like to go to the sheriff's 
office. He never resisted, but we walked up the 
stairs and 'vhen we got to the top of the stairs 
there was another, either marshal or, I wouldn't 
be sure, but I believe it was Hoyt, I am not sure, 
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a city marshal,- I think. Of course I am not 
familiar with these names, I just since this 
came up got acquainted with them." 
Segler from Transcript page 106: 
"I told them I thought that Mr. Hopkins, her father, 
or some attorney should be in her presence. And they 
refused to let either one of us go in." 
William Hopkins, Direct, T. page 114: 
"A I remember, if my memory serves me rightly, 
I appeared there between four and five o'clock 
and went immediately into the sheriff's office; 
and there we contacted Mr. Benson, Sheriff 
Miller and Sheriff Bybee, and as I remember it 
right, I made the remark that it didn't look to 
me like a fair, square deal, to railroad that girl 
into that sheriff's office without counsel or 
friends of any description. 
Q What was the answer to that? 
A Well, if I remember right, I believe Mr. Benson 
related that she was under suspicion. And if I 
remember right I believe I told him that we was 
very sorry, that we had no-that was the first 
information I had to that effect that she was 
even under suspicion, and he informed me that 
she was under suspicion." 
Defendant was questioned and k·ept in the Court Room 
from 4 ,P.M. until 9:30 .P.M. without food or rest: 
Nelson, Direct, T. page 71 : 
"Q Will you tell us the time of day that conversa-
tion took place? 
A As near as I can remember it was about four 
o'clock." 
Wells, Direct, T. page 129: 
"The Court: Did she leave the room at any time 
during the period from when she first went into 
the courtroom until she left in the evening? 
A. No sir. 
The Court: Was she offered the opportunity to 
leave the room at any time? 
A I don't think that I remember of a request be-
10 
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ing made or the offer being made at any time, 
Judge. 
The Court: What time was it that she actually did 
leave the courtroom? 
A That was possibly, I would say, between 9:30 
and a quarter to ten. 
The Court: Did you notice the time? When you 
say 'possibly' that doesn't help u.s. 
A I came out of the courtroom at 9 :30, yes, sir. 
I noticed the time." 
Wells, Cr.oss, T. page 135 : 
Q Did you offer anything, any food, didn't you say 
"Will you have lunch? Will you eat? Did you 
say that? 
A You mean after four o'clock? 
Q Yes. 
A No." 
Nelson, Direct, T. page 7 4 : 
"Q Was anything said to Mrs. Ashdown that she 
was free to leave the courtroom if she cared to? 
A By George, I don't remember about that." 
Walter Segler, Direct, T. page 108: 
"***But before that, when Mr. Wells come out he 
says, 'Well' he says, 'it has been six and a half 
hours in this." 
Defendant was in an hysterical condition during the 
questioning: 
After defendant made the alleged oral confession in the 
evening of the 9th day of July, she was placed under arrest 
but she wasn't asked to sign any written statement until 
the next day on the lOth. To show that defendant was hys-
terical and not in a calm or unexcited state and didn't know 
what she was doing on July 9th when the alleged confession 
was made, the following is quoted from the record: 
Nelson, Direct, T. page 86: 
"The Court: Sheriff, why did you wait until the 
afternoon of the lOth before offering this to 
1\Irs. Ashdo\vn to sign? 
11 
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A Well, we didn't take any written statement on 
the 9th. We thought we would talk to her on 
the lOth, she would be calm and wouldn't be ex-
eit·ed and she would know what she was doing. 
We didn't want to feel like taking advantage of 
ber." 
Walter Segler, Direct, T. page 107 : 
"A And at that time I heard her crying and carry-
ing on in there. 
Q How long did you hear her crying? 
A A couple of times when I was in the hall, and I 
don't know how long. 
Q And you were there in the hall how long would 
you say, how many hours? 
A Well, in the Sheriff's office and thereabout and 
back and forth to Mrs. Ashdown's place, I would 
say we was there approximately two and a half 
hours, or such a matter." 
William Hopkins, R.edirect, T. page 116: 
"Q Could you hear Mildred crying? 
A I could. Crying and moaning. 
Q All the time you were there? 
A Well, at intervals, most of the time, yes." 
Wells, Cross Examination, T. page 135: 
"Q Was she crying? 
A She would sob and cry at times., yes sir." 
Defendant did not have benefit of counsel during such 
examination although she requesrted it and her father and 
uncle requested it: 
Nelson, Direct, T. page 78: 
"***At that point she said 'I had ought to have an 
attorney.' 'Well' I said 'you have told us about every-
thing now except the strychnine.' I says, 'Tell us 
where you got the strychnine and we can clear it up 
and get this over with.' 
Nelson, Direct, T. p. 86: 
"A She said 'I had ought to have an attorney,' that 
is the way she put it. 
12 
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The Court: And then what was said? 
A Well, I told her, I said 'Well, you told us about 
everything now except where you got the 
strychnine.' I says 'It is a little late to get an 
attorney.' " 
The Court: What did she say then? 
A She didn't ask any more for an attorney. She 
never mentioned one any more." 
Nelson, Cross, T. page 87: 
"Q Now, you stated to the court that after she 
asked for counsel she had confessed everything 
but where she g.ot the strychnine, is that cor-
rect? 
A Yes, that is right. 
Q And you felt, like you told the court, there was 
no need for doing that, just as well get it over 
with. 
A Yes, that is the way I felt about it. 
Q You didn't heed to her request, then did you? 
A No, we didn't." 
Nelson, Cross, T. page 97: 
"Q Now, how many times, sheriff, did that girl ask 
for counsel, one, two or three times? 
A I heard her ask the one time. 
Q Why didn't you give it to her, sheriff. 
A Well, she had told us about everything then." 
Segler, Direct, T. page 105: 
"A Well, I says, it isn't fair to take that girl up 
there and question her without her father's 
presence or an attorney.*** 
A And I .says, I am her uncle and this is her fa-
ther. And I says, 'I don't think she has got a 
right to be questi·oned without her father's pres-
ence or some attorney." 
Segler, T. page 106: 
"A And when I told them up there again that I was 
her uncle, and I didn't think they had a right to 
take her in and question her, and one of the of-
ficers, I don't know which one it was spoke up 
and says, 'Why she'.s got an attorney in there 
to defend her.' He says, 'to give her constitu-
13 
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tional rights.' I says: 'Is he her attorney, or 
who?' I says, 'I didn't know anything about it 
until this time.' " 
Segler, T'. page 109 : 
"A Well, I am not sure, but it seems to me like it 
was Mr. Benson, it was one of them, like I said 
I wasn't acquainted with the men, didn't know 
them at the time, but they said she has got an 
attorney in there to advise her, and so they 
didn't want to let us in, because I said that I 
figured she needed her father's presence or an 
attorney. And they said 'Why she's got an at-
torney in there to advise her.' And that is the 
only answer we got, in regards to that." 
William Hopkins, Direct, T. p. 114: 
"A ***and there we contacted Mr. Benson, Sheriff 
Miller and Sheriff Bybee, and as I remember it 
right, I made the remark that it didn't look to 
me like a fair, square deal, to rail:r.oad that girl 
into that sheriff's office without counsel or 
friends of any description. 
*** 
Q Did you ask for counsel then? 
A Yes. I said 'I believe that she should have an 
attorney in there.' And I made the remark that 
I intended to employ you as an attorney." 
Hopkins, ReDirect, T. p. 116: 
"A Yes, I told them when I first went in there I 
thought that that was wrong for them to take 
her in there and quiz her and railroad her." 
Wells, Cros:s, T. p. 136: 
"Q Now, you said she did ask for counsel. Was 
there anyone that spoke up and said you can 
get him, we will go get him for you now? 
A I think in answering that-
Q Just answer that 
A She did ask for counsel 
Q And she didn't get counsel 
A Not at that time, no, sir. 
Q Did she ever tell you, 'I .don't want counsel?' 
A No, that statement was never made to me." 
14 
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Defendant's oral confession was not voluntary and the 
following excerpts from the record show that it wasn't and 
that induceme~nts were made: 
Nelson, Direct, T. p. 73 : 
"Well, I said to Mrs. Ashdown again, that the doctor 
still claimed that Ray had been poisoned and we 
would like to find out what had happened and asked 
her if there was any chance she had made a mistake 
of any kind and put poison in that lemon juice and 
thought it was salt.**" 
Nelson, Direct T. p. 76: 
"A Well, then I asked Mrs. Ashdown again, I says, 
'Now,' I says, 'Think and see if there has been 
a chance that there has been a mistake made, 
any kind of a mistake made' I says 'we should 
know about it and we could iron it out.'" 
Nelson, Direct, T. p. 77: 
***And I think I asked her about the same thing 
over again, that somebody must have put some 
poison in the cup because Ray was pronounced being 
poisoned." 
Nelson, Direct T. p. 78 : 
***Why don't you tell us the truth about that poison 
and how it got in the cup. I says 'Tell us the truth 
about it so as w~e can clear this thing up.' She started 
crying and said 'I will never see my children any 
more.'' And I says, 'Yes, you would see your chilrden 
again, Mrs. Ashdown.' I says, 'Your children will be 
taken care of.' I says, 'Just tell us who put the 
poison in the cup." 
Nelson, Cross, T. p. 93: 
"Q Then I asked you at the hearing, to impress it 
very much, at that time I will ask you did not 
Patrick Fenton, the distirct attorney, in your 
presence and in the presence of Mr. Welsh, say 
'I killed five men while I was in the Army and 
it is better to confess, I got off. If I hadn't 
done that' and you studied and you studied, and 
you said you didn't hear that statement.***You 
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know now it was said. 
Yes, I know there was something to that effect, 
now, yes. 
Milda Hopkins Ashdown, Direct T. p. 112: 
"Q Milda, will you tell the court when you were be-
ing examined by the officers what Pat Fenton 
told you in reference to killing those men? 
A Well, he said 'if you will tell us what happened, 
why it will go a lot easier on you. He says, I 
confessed and it was a lot easier on me, If I 
hadn't confessed I might not have gotten off .. I 
might have been facing the firing squad now.'" 
Wells, Direct, T. p. 123: 
"Sheriff Nelson asked her if there couldn't have been 
some mistake of when this liquid was taken by her 
husband. He asked her if she couldn't have made a 
mistake by putting something in the liquid besides 
salt. 
Q Was that subject dwelled on at any great length, 
Mr. Wells? 
A Yes, sir. That question was asked her, to the 
best of my recollection fifteen or twenty times." 
Wells, Direct, T. p. 126: 
"Mr. Nelson at that time asked Mrs. Ashdown, and I 
think the statement was made this way: He says, 
"Mrs. Ashdown, you know that Ray did not mix the 
poisoning and take it his self." 
Wells, Direct, T. p. 127: 
"Mr. Fenton made the statement as I recall being in 
quite a predicament at one time his self; that he was 
accused of killing four men and through the coopera-
tion of the investigating officers and by telling the 
truth the investigating officers was of much value 
to him and possibly saved him from the firing 
squad." 
Wells, examinati.on by the Court, T. p. 137: 
"Can you tell me how it came about that Mr. Fenton 
read those statutes relating to murder or manslaugh-
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A At that time, your Honor, I think that she was 
asked if a mistake could have been made, at the 
time that this lemon juice was mixed, and if 
there had been a mistake made, I think Mr. Fen-
ton, as I understood it, described the different 
penalties, in case that there would have been a 
prosecution." 
Q And what did she say: 
A As I remember it he read the statutes to her 
and told her the difference, that if a prosecu-
tion, a complaint was issued against her, of 
what the difference of the complaint would be. 
Q Was there anything said about it would be bet-
ter for her to tell what happened at that time? 
A I think she was told at that time that if there 
had been a mistake made, that in case of prose-
cution it would be a lesser degree, the crime." 
Fenton, examination by the Court, page 144: 
"A Yes, your H·onor. Mrs. Ashdown had been asked 
by the sheriff several times if there was any 
possibility of an accident in connection with 
this matter, if she might possibly have got hold 
of some poison and put it in the lemon juice 
thinking it was salt. And at one point during 
the phase of the conversation I told Mrs. Ash-
down that at one time in Europe I had been 
accused of killing five men and that I had told 
the investigating officers of what had happen-
ed, and that they had helped and in effect 
cleared me of the charges, and that if it was an 
accident she might wish to tell the investigat-
ing officers what had happened." 
Nelson, Direct, T. p. 159: 
"I told Mrs. Ashdown, I sars. 'Is there any chance, 
possible chance, that there has been a mistake made, 
accidently, or any other way? and I says, 'If there 
has, I 'vish we knew about it.' 'Well,' I says, 'Some-
one must kno\v something· about it." 
Nelson, Direct, T. p. 160: 
***And I says, 'Someone had to--someone had to put 
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Nelson, Direct, T. p. 161: 
***Finally I said to Mrs. Ashdown, I said, 'Mrs. Ash-
down, I don't believe that Ray put that poison in that 
juice.' I said, 'Why don't you tell us the truth about 
that poison and who put it in?' She says 'I'll never 
see my children any more.' 'Yes,' I .says 'You'll see 
your children again, that will be taken care of." 
Wells, Cross, T. p. 173 : 
"Mr. Nelson at that time asked Mrs. Ashdown, he 
told Mrs. Ashdown that he didn't believe that that 
was the truth, that he didn't think that Ray had 
mixed the strychnine in the lemon juice; therefore, 
he asked Mrs. Ashdown to tell him the truth about 
who put the strychnine in the lemon juice.***" · · 
Wells, Cross, T. p. 181: 
"Mr. Fenton at that time told Mrs. Ashdown that he 
had an experience and was charged at that time with 
killing four men, I think, in Europe, and he had co-
operated with the investigators who was investigat-
ing the case and they were the ones that had helped 
to clear him." 
Defendant was not properly advised of her Constitu-
tional rights: 
There is a little conflict in the record as to just when 
or how defendant was advised of her Constitutional rights. 
At any rate it was not at the beginning of the questioning 
as the record bears out: 
Nelson, Direct, T. p. 74: 
"Q Sheriff, prior to asking Mrs. Ashdown if she 
had made a mistake, was Mrs. Ashdown inform-
ed as to whether or not she needed to answer 
your questions ? 
A I don't believe at that time. I believe it was a 
little later on when we advised her of her-when you 
advised her of her constitutional rights. I don't be-
liev-e it was right on the start. 
*** A We had talked to her a f,ew minutes befove that, 
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Q Will you tell us as nearly as you can remember 
the words that were used in explaining Mrs. 
Ashdown's rights to her? 
A Yes, you told her you wanted to advise her of 
her constitutional rights, that she was entitled 
to an attorney, that she didn't have to answer 
any questions unless she wanted to, the ques-
tions that she did answer could be used against 
her in court if it came to court. I think that is 
about what you told her.*** 
Q Was anything said to Mrs. Ashdown about she 
was free to leave the Courtroom if she cared to? 
A By George, I don't remember about that." 
Nelson, Cross, T. p. 89: 
"Q All right, then you told the court that you start-
ed to question her, you don't know just how 
long after Mr. Fenton, after you had been ques-
tioning her,-you said it was after you had 
been questioning her, he advised her of her con-
stitutional rights. Is that right? 
A It wasn't long after we started questioning her. 
Q Would you say half an hour or an hour? 
A I would say around a half hour." 
Officers repeated their questions over and over: 
Nelson, Direct, T. p. 76 : 
"***I says 'No, we don't want you to confess to any-
thing you didn't do ; we don't want anyone to con-
fess to something they didn't do.' And I think that 
was told to her at least twenty-five or thirty times 
during the conversation in the evening." 
Nelson, Direct, T. p. 77: 
"***And I think I asked her about the same thing 
over again, that somebody must have put some pois-
on in the cup because Ray was pronounced being 
poisoned." 
Wells, Direct, T. p. 123: 
"Yes, sir, That question was asked her, to the best 
of my recollection fiftee·n or twenty times." 
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It is a fundamental rule of criminal law that a confes-
sion may not be used against a defendant, unless the prose-
cution can show its free and voluntary character, that it was 
made without previous inducement, and that neither duress 
nor intimidation caused defendant to furnish such evidence 
against himself, and so long as the constitutional privilege of 
a defendant not to give evidence against himself exists, that 
right must be protected by adherence to the well established 
rule intended to guard against undue advantage being taken 
of his fears, hopes or mental or physical weakness. See Peo-
ple v. Loper 112 Pac, 720 (Cal.) 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Crank, 
105 Utah, 332, 142 ·Pac. 2nd, 178, held that the state has 
burden of proving that alleged confession was voluntary by 
a preponderance of all the evidence on that question. Our 
court in this case reviews American authorities on the ques-
tion of when a confession is voluntary from which the fol-
lowing is quoted : 
From page 189 of the Pacific Report: 
In the fol1owing cases the language in each mentioned 
was held to be an inducement sufficient to exclude a confes-
sion or statement made in consequence thereof: In Kelly 
v. State (1882) 72 Ala. 244, saying to the prisoner 'You have 
got your foot in it, and somebody else was with you. Now, 
if you did break open the door, the best thing you can do is 
to tell all about it, and to tell who was with you, and to tell 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.' In 
People v. Barrie, 49 Cal, 342, saying to the accused: 'It will 
be better for you to make a full disclosure.' In People v. 
Thompson ( 1890) 84 Cal, 598, 605, 24 Pac. 384-6, saying to 
the accused: 'I don't think the truth will hurt anybody. It 
will be better for you to come out and tell all you know about 
it, if you feel that way.' ***In Biscoe v. State (1887) 67 
Md. 6 8 A 571 saying to the accused : 'It will be better for 
you t~ tell th~ truth, and have no more trouble about it.' 
***In Com. v. Myers (1894) 160 Mass. 530, 36 N.E. 481, 
saying to the accused: 'You had better tell the t1·uth.' ***In 
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Vaughan v. Com. (1867) 17 Gratt, Va. 566, saying to the 
accused: 'You had as well tell all about it.' " 
And further quoting from Justice's Larsen's opinion in 
State v. Crank, from page 190 of the Pacific Report: 
"The New Mexico court distinguishes the two cases by 
the statement 'appellant is an intelligent, educated man' 
which makes in the Wickman case. In other words, the court 
holds that in the case of an uneducated person it will more 
easily infer some promise of leniency which would influence 
the mind of the accused to confess, than in the case of an 
educated man.*** (bold face type added) 
The "Vyoming court in Maki v. State, 18 Wyo, 481, 112 
P. 334, 335, 33 L.R.A.N.S. 465, was considering whether 
testimony given by the accused at an inquest was admissible 
as being a voluntary confession, and gave the following def-
inition: 'A statement, to have been voluntarily made, must 
proceed frcm the spontaneous suggestion of the party's own 
mind, f~ee from the influence of any extraneous, disturbing 
cause.' (Bold face type added). 
Going on, the court quotes 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, 225: 
'The manner of the examination is therefore particularly re-
garded; and if it appears that the prisoner had not been left 
wholly free, and did not consider himself to be so in what 
he was called upon to say, or did not feel himself at liberty 
to wholly decline any explanation or declaration whatever, 
the examination is not held to have been voluntary." 
.1\nd from page 191 of the Pacific Report, same case: 
"In a case of long protracted questioning of a Chinese, 
in the absence of an interpreter, friends or counsel, People 
v. Quan Gim G.o\v, 23 Cal App. 507, 138 P. 918, 919. the court 
said: 'Vvhile no physical force "'"as used, and neither threats 
nor promises made, there can be do doubt at all but that the 
repeated questioning of the officers, like the constant drop-
ping of water upon a rock (bold face type added) finally wore 
through his mental resolution of silence. Admittedly, his 
refusal at first to ans'\\rer incriminating questions gave evi-
dence of a desire to make no statement. When, then, did this 
unwillingness vanish and a desire to talk succeed it? Not 
after he had been given any period of time for reflection; 
for his inquisitors aUowed him none. The examination was 
persisted until a response was forthcoming, and, under the 
circun1stances, it must be said that the responses appear to 
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have been unwillingly made and as a direct result of con-
tinued importuning.***The fact that the questi.oning was 
done by police officers presents an important item for con-
sideration in determining whether the admissions extracted 
were of a voluntary character.'*** 
In State v. Johnson, 95 Utah, 572, 83 P. 2d 1010, 1013, 
the court considered the matter of voluntariness, and said: 
'In determining whether a confession was voluntary there 
must be taken into consideration the age and intelligence of 
the witness, the place and conditions under which the state-
ment was made, the circumstances that invoked the conver-
sation, as well as the nature, content and import of the state-
ment itself.' " 
Therefore, in view of the record and evidence which 
show so clearly that the statements made by the defendant 
herein were not free and voluntary but were the result of 
duress, intimidation, sustained pressure and inducement by 
the officers of Iron County, and that all of such proceedings 
were definitely in violation of the constitutional rights of 
the defendant, defendant-appellant strongly contends that 
the Court erred in finding there was no coercion of defen-
dant, or that she had not been denied any constitutional 
rights, and the record and evidence will not support the 
Court's findings in these respects. 
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BY THE 
STATE TO THE EFFECT THAT DEFENDANT UNDER 
ORAL QUESTIONING PRIOR TO HER ARREST, ORAL-
LY CONFESSED TO THE CRIME CHARGED, FOR. THE 
REASON THAT SUCH TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE 
WERE OBTAINED THROUGH COERCION, DURESS 
AND PROMISES OF IMMUNITY AND IN VIOLATION 
OF LAW AND OF THE GUARANTEES OF THE CON-
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It is a well settled rule of law that a confession will not 
be admitted in evidence unless it was voluntarily made. The 
Appellant contends that all of the testimony relating to the 
oral confession of the defendant was inadmissible owing to 
the method in which it was obtained, which, as has been 
clearly shown in the preceding argument covered by Point 
II, that the statements were not free and voluntary, and that 
the method of examination was against the guarantees of 
the 5th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
which guarantees that the accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself, and the sanction thereto by 
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, 
and in violation of defendant's right to due process as guar-
anteed by our National and State Constitutions, and that the 
admitting of such testimony in evidence was error by the 
court. There are numerous authorities on this subject of 
which the following are some of the late decisions: 
Commonwealth v. Burke, 1951, (Pa) 79A 2d 654 
(Murder in the first degree) : Due process was de-
nied to the defendant because after his arrest he was 
held by the police incommunicado under a fictitious 
name and subjected to coercion and extensive police 
questioning until he confessed to the crime. "A con-
viction in a capital case based upon a confession or 
self-incriminating testimony which has been coerced 
fr·om the defendant to police .officers constitutes a 
denial of due process." 
State v. Archer, 1953, (Iowa), 58 N.W. 2d 44, (Mur-
der) Defendant was denied due process when the 
trial court allowed into evidence at his trial confes-
sions obtained from him after he was badgered with-
out rest to give the statements in the confessions as 
demanded by the officers while they had detained 
him illegally. Although the confessions stated that 
they were voluntarily made by the defendant, the 
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In Watts v. State of Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 69 S. Ct., 
1347, 13.50, the United States Supreme Court said: 
"A statement to be voluntary of course need not be 
volunteered, but if it is the product of sustained pres-
sure by the police it does not issue f:r:om a free choice. 
When a suspect speaks because he is overborne, it is 
immaterial whether he has been subjected to a phys-
ical or a mental ordeal. Eventual yielding to ques-
tioning under such circumstances is plainly the prod-
uct of the suction process of interrogation and there-
fore the reverse of voluntary." 
In a recent decision in the case of People v. Cahan, 282 
P. 2d 905 (Cal.) the following is quoted: (Reading from 
page 911 of Justice T·raynor's Opinion) 
"Despite the persuasive force of the foregoing argu-
ments, we have concluded as Justice Carter and Jus-
tice Schauer have consistently maintained, that evi-
dence obtained in violation of the constitutional guar-
antees is inadmissible. (Bold face type added). 
People v. Le Doux, 155 Cal. 535, 102 P. 517; People 
v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 ·p. 435, 24 A.L.R. 1383, 
and the cases based thereon are therefore overruled. 
We have been compelled to reach that conclusion be-
cause other remedies have completely failed to secure 
compliance with the constitutional provisions on the 
part of police officers with the attendant result that 
the courts under the old rule have been constantly 
required to participate in, and in effect condone, the 
lawless activities of law enforcement officers. When, 
as in the present case, the very purpose of an illegal 
search and seizure is to get evidence to introduce at 
a trial, the success of the lawless venture depends 
entirely on the court's lending its aid by allowing the 
evidence to be introduced. It is no answer to say 
that a distinction should be drawn between the gov-
ernment acting as law enforcer and the gatherer of 
evidence and the government acting as j-udge. ***It 
is morally incongruous for the state to flout consti-
tutional rights and at the same time demand that its 
citizens observe the law. The end that the state 
seeks may be a laudable one, but it no more justifies 
unlawful acts than a laudable end justified unlawful 
action by any member of the public. Moreover, any 
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process of law that sanctions the imposition of pen-
alties upon an individual through the use of the 
fruits of official lawlessness tends to the destruction 
of the whole system of restraints on the exercise of 
the public force that are inherent in the 'concept of 
ordered liberty.' See Allen, The Wolf Case, 45 Ill, L. 
Rev. 1, 20. 'Decency, security and liberty alike de-
mand that government officials shall be subjected to 
the same rules of conduct that are commands to the 
citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the 
government will be imperilled if it fails to observe 
the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, 
the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill it teach-
es the whole people by its example. Crime is con-
tagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it 
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to 
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To 
declare that in the administration of the criminal 
law the end justifies the means-to declare that the 
government may commit crimes in order to secure 
the conviction of a private criminal-would bring 
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doc-
trine this court should resolutely set its face.' 
Brandeis, J. dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U. S. 438, 485, 48 S. Ct. 564,575 and cases cited. 
If the unconstitutional conduct of the law enforce-
ment officers were more flagrant or more closely con-
nected with the conduct of the trial, it is clear that 
the £oregoing principles would compel the reversal of 
any conviction based thereon. Thus, no matter how 
guilty a defendant might be or how outrageous his 
crime, he must not be deprived of a fair trial, and 
any action, official or otherwise, that 'vould have 
that effect would not be tolerated. Similarly, he may 
not be convicted on the basis of evidence obtained 
by the use of the rack or screw or other brutal means 
no matter how reliable the evidence obtained may be. 
Rochin v. People of Cal, supra, 342 U. S. 165, 72 S. 
Ct. 205. Today one of the foremost public concerns 
is the police state, and recent history has demon-
strated all too clearly how short the step is from law-
less although efficient enforcement of the law to 
the stamping out of human rights (bold face type 
added). This peril has been recognized and dealt with 
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when its challenge has been obvi·ous; Police officers 
and prosecuting officials are primarily interested in 
convicting criminals. Given the exclusionary rule 
and a choice between securing evidenc by legal rather 
than illegal means, officers will be impelled to obey 
the law themselves since not to do so will jeopardize 
their objectives. Moreover, the same considerations 
that justify the privilege against self incrimination 
are not irrelevent here. As Wigmore points out, that 
privilege, just as the prohibition against unreason-
able searches and seizures, is primarily for the pro-
tection of the innocent. 'The real objection is that 
any system of administration which permits the 
prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory self-
disclosure as a source of proof must itself morally 
suffer thereby. The inclination develops to rely main-
ly upon such evidence, and to be satisfied with an 
incomplete investigation of the other sources. The 
exercise of the power to extract answers begets a 
forgetfulness of the just limitations of that power. 
The simple and peaceful process of questioning 
breeds a readiness to resort to bullying and to 
physical force and torture. If there is a right to an 
answer, there soon seems to be a right to the expect-
ed answer,- that is, to a confession of guilt. Thus 
the legitimate use grows into the unjust abuse; ulti-
mately, the innocent are jeopardized by the encroach-
ments of a bad system. Such seems to have been the 
course .of experience in those legal systems where the 
privilege was not recognized.' (8 Wigmore on Evi-
dence 3rd Ed. 2251 p. 309). Similarly, a system that 
permits the prosecution to trust habitually to the use 
of illegally obtained evidence cannot help but encour-
age violations of the constitution at the expense of 
lawful means of enforcing the law. See, Frankfurter, 
J. dissenting in Harris v. United States, supra, 331, 
U. S. 145, 172, 67 S. Ct. 1098. On the other hand, if 
courts respect the constitutional provisions by refus-
ing to sanction their violation, they will not only 
command respect of law abiding citizens for them-
selves adhering to the law, they will also arouse pub-
lic opinion as a deterrent to lawless enforcement of 
the law by bringing just criticism to bear on law 
enforcement officers who allow criminals to escape 
by pursuing them in ~awl~ss ways. * * *9a.ses undol;lbt-
edly arise where a violation of the pnVIlege against 
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self-incrimination, a coerced confession, the testi-
mony of defendant's spouse, a violati~on of the attor-
ney-client privilege or other privilege is essential to· 
the conviction of the criminal, but the choice has 
been made that he go unpunished. Arguments 
against the wisdom of these rights and privileges, 
just as arguments against the wisdom of the prohib-
itions against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
should be addressed to the question whether they 
should exist at all, but arguments against the wis-
dom of the constitutional provisions may not be in-
voked to justify a failure to enforce them while they 
remain the law of the land." 
And from foot note 4, page 909, of the above case: 
"The Wolf and Irvine cases would then be brought 
into line with the cases holding coerced confessions 
inadmissible. (Cases cited). It is now settled that 
such confessions are excluded, not because they may 
lack evidential trustworthiness ('a coerced confession 
is inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even 
though statements in it may be independently estab-
lished as true.' Watts v. State of Indiana, supra, 338, 
U. S. 49, 50, 69 S. Ct. 1347, 1348 and cases cited" but 
because of the manner in which they are obtained. 
(See McC,ormick, Developments in Admissibility of 
Confessions, 24 Tex. L. Rev. 239, 245)"*** 
In view of the fundamental rules of law governing the 
admissibility of confessions, and of all the circumstances 
respecting the method in which the admissions of the defen-
dant-appellant herein were obtained, it is contended by the 
appellant herein that the Court erred grossly in admitting 
such evidence over the objection of her counsel. 
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN CHARGING 
THE JURY AS PER HIS INSTRUCTION NO. 6, BY 
WHICH THE JURY WAS CONFUSED AND MISDIRECT-
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Defendant contends that it was not alone a question for 
the Jury to find whether they believed the statements had 
or had not been made by defendant during the oral question-
ing prior to her arrest, but rather whether they believed 
such statements, had been made by the defendant and that 
such statements were the free and voluntary statements of 
defendant and not made under coercion, duress and prom-
ises of immunity, and the Court in failing to so instruct 
committed error in submitting the same to the Jury. 
Under Instruction No. 6, the Jury was instructed that 
they could consider the statements made by the defendant 
on the two occasions she was interviewed by the officers, in 
answer to their questions, and that they could consider the 
surrounding circumstances including the events~ of the day 
and the experiences of the defendant during the day and on 
days immediately preceding, the attitude and conduct of the 
officers mentioned, their statements to the defendant, and 
whether any threats were made or any promises, either ex-
press or implied, of immunity for prosecution, or whether 
any assurance was given of any benefit or reward to the de-
fendant if she made a statement. They were also charged 
to consider the length of time covered by the questioning 
and whether the circumstances show any coercion or com-
pulsion or any physical or mental strain or suffering or fear 
or hysteria on the part of the defendant during the time. 
Then the Court says, quoting from said Instruction No. 6: 
"After giving due consideration to all the surrounding cir-
cumstances, you should determine whether the alleged state-
ments were made by the defendant, and if so, whether such 
statements or any of them are entitled to be believed and if 
so to what extent. You are the exclusive judges of the cred-
ibility of such statements and the weight to be given to them 
if you believe that any such statements were made." 
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This Instruction fails to advise the Jury that if they 
should find that the alleged statements were not freely and 
voluntariy made, that they (the Jury) should disregard 
them. 
Our Utah Supreme Court has passed upon this question 
in the case of State v. Crank, 105 Utah, 332, 142 Pac. 2nd, 
178. From page 185 of the Pacific Report, I quote Justice 
Larson: 
"The law relative to just what part the jury may 
play in determining whether a confession was volun-
tary is in an unhappy state of flux. There is no uni-
formity in the decision. Roughly speaking they may 
be placed in three classes. Some hold that the ques-
tion is soley one of law for the Court. ***The second 
group of jurisdictions have decisions which seem to 
hold that the question of voluntariness of a confes-
sion should be submitted to the jury for a .determin-
ation of whether it was sufficiently voluntary for 
them to consider it as evidence in making their con-
clusion as to his guilt. In many of these states the 
question has not been squarely passed upon, and what 
is said in the opinions is largely dicta based upon the 
practice in vogue. We shall examine these cases 
later. The States which may be placed in this group 
are: (various states) and Utah.*** 
Fl'om page 186 : 
We now turn to the cases in the second group. The 
practice there is best expressed by the court of Cali-
fornia and of Massachusetts. In People v. Black, 73 
Cal, App. 13, 238 P. 37 4, 376, the court said: 'Before 
we exhibit the state of the record upon this situation, 
it may be well to state the rule \vhich regulates the 
respective functions of judge and jury when the 
question of the admissibility of a confession arises 
in a criminal case. The judge must determine, first, 
and as a matter of course, whether the confession 
was free and voluntary, and whether, therefore, it is 
to be heard by the jury. Notwithstanding, however, 
the settlement of this question, which is merely pre-
liminary, and which bears solely upon the matter of 
the admissibility of the confession, as already indi-
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cated, there is yet a function to be exercised by the 
jury concerning it. In allowing the confession to go 
to the jury, the judge has ruled, it is true, that it 
was freely and voluntarily made, but the ruling in no 
way binds the jury. (bold face type added). That 
body, now considering the matter substantively, may 
disregard the view of the judge made evident by his 
permitting the confession to be heard, and may, as 
the trier of all final questions of fact in the case, 
conclude that the confession was not free and volun-
tary, and may therefore refuse to consider it.' 
And from page 188: 
In deliberating on a verdict the jury considers all the 
evidence submitted to it as it bears upon the ques-
tion to be decided. Conflicts must be reconciled by 
the jury, or it (the jury) must decide which it be-
lieves. It must also determine what weight it as-
cribes or gives to the various items of evidence. 
Since a defendant cannot be compelled to give evi-
dence against himself either in or out of court-that 
is, since the jury can only cons:ider statements of de-
fendant which are his voluntary and free will act, 
the jury must of necessity, as to any statements at-
tributed to him, determine if they were free and vol-
untary, for testimony otherwise obtained from ac-
cused is entitled to no credence in law. When there 
is a conflict in the evidence as· to how a confession 
was given, the court advises the jury that evidence 
of the accused, involuntarily given, is as a matter of 
law entitled to no credence. (bold face type added) Or 
as generally put in the decisi·ons, the court instructs 
the jury that if any confessing statements attributed 
to accused were not his free and voluntary utterances 
they should disregard them, which is simply the 
same as saying as a matter of law it is entitled to no 
weight or credence. This is the real substance of 
nearly all the decisions which say that the jury ulti-
mately determines the question of the voluntariness 
of the confession. It is closely akin to the standard 
stock instruction that if the jury believe that a wit-
ness has knowingly testified falsely on any material 
matter they may disbelieve all hi~ testimony. Thus 
the voluntariness of the confession as a matter of 
law is solely for the determination of the court; that 
is to say, the court is the sole judge of the question 
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as to whether the confession was obtained in a way 
the law does not sanction ; whether things were done 
to obtain a confession which render it incompetent 
as not the result .of a free and untrammelled will, as 
a matter of law. Was it obtained in such a way that 
the law suppresses it as the result of taking unfair, 
an unconstitutional advantage of the accused? That 
is the problem of the court. It may well be that al-
though it was not obtained under such conditions 
that the law '\\7ill suppress it, yet it may have been 
obtained under such conditions that as a substantive 
matter the accused may have been led, caused or in-
duced to make statements or admit facts against 
himself, not the result of his own will or choice but 
by the suggestions, veiled implications, or conduct of 
others in a position of apparent advantage. Did it 
emanate from the desire of the accused to tell the 
truth or from other motives induced by the actions, 
words, or circumstances created by others who are 
in an apparent position of advantage to help or hin-
der? If the jury thinks it so obtained they may give 
it no credence or weight whatever. See Greenleaf, 
16th Ed. Vol. 1_ pp 355, 356; Wigmore, 3rd Ed., Vol. 
III, pp 349, 350 and cases cited. This becomes a 
question of fact for the jury, and they may be told 
to disergard it as unworthy of belief if they find it 
was so obtained. There is then no conflict between 
the function of the court and jury." 
Appellant contends that in the instant case none of the 
testimony as to her admissions should have been admitted 
and that the Court erred in finding that such statements 
were v:oluntary, and agrees with what Justice Wade said in 
his concurring opinion in State v. Crank that the important 
thing is that the judge be convinced that the confession is 
voluntary before he gives it to the jury; that he holds· the 
trump card and once given to the jury if it was in reality 
not voluntaril~r given, much harm may be done. 
But after the Court did admit such testimony in evi-
dence it was his duty to have instructed the jury that if 
the Jur~~ f.ound these statements were not free and voluntary 
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utterances of defendant, that they should disregard them. 
But instruction No. 6 failed in this regard and could only 
have confused and misdirected the Jury. The Jury didn't 
know what to do even if they believed the statements made 
by defendant weren't voluntarily made, for the Court had 
only instructed them that all they had to find was whether 
they belived such statements had been made by defendant 
and if they were true. It may have been that the Jury in this 
case believed the statements had been involuntarily made, 
yet, because of the insufficiency and the confusing nature of 
the Instruction, they may have been constrained to reach a 
verdict of conviction because they didn't know if they were 
not satisfied that such statements were voluntarily made 
that they should give no credence to them. 
POINT V. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL. 
POINT VI. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
Defendant asserts that for all the reasons set forth 
above, the lower Court committed error in denying the mo-
tion of the defense for a directed verdict made at the con-
clusion of the trial, and in denying defendant's Motion for 
New Trial, and that for the reasons submitted herein the 
verdict of the Jury and decision of the trial court should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. VERNON ERICKSON, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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